Criticism of individualist and collectivist methodological approaches to social emergence

Amiri Tehrani, M.R.

doi:10.22035/isih.2023.5009.4843

Criticism of individualist and collectivist methodological approaches to social emergence

Document Type : Original Research Paper

Author

M.R. Amiri Tehrani

Assistant Professor in Philosophy of Science and Technology, Department of Interdisciplinary Studies, Faculty of Economy, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, Iran

https://doi.org/10.22035/isih.2023.5009.4843

Abstract

The individual-community relationship has always been one of the most fundamental topics of social sciences. In sociology, this is known as the micro-macro relationship while in economics it refers to the processes, through which, individual actions lead to macroeconomic phenomena. Based on philosophical discourse and systems theory, many sociologists even use the term "emergence" in their understanding of micro-macro relationship, which refers to collective phenomena that are created by the cooperation of individuals, but cannot be reduced to individual actions. "Emergence" theories attempt to explain the nature of society as a complex system by examining how individuals and their relationships lead to the creation of integrated and macro-social phenomena such as markets, educational systems, cultural beliefs, and shared social practices. As a prelude to activity, every researcher has to answer the question from the methodological point of view, how is it possible to study the behavior of social groups and how can we gain knowledge about the laws related to social groups? Anyone who deals with humanities and social sciences or any reality and phenomenon that affects human beings, inevitably deals with the reality that is emerging. In fact, emergence occurs when one level of reality emerges radically from another level. Examples of emergent levels of reality include how the mind emerges from the body; or the way society emerges from human beings. Therefore, when there is an emerging factor, different scientific disciplines should be used, because it is inevitable to talk about social affairs, psychology and neurobiology, as well as physical and even chemical.

Keywords

social emergence

methodological individualism

methodological collectivism

downward causality

realism

reductionism

subvenience

Subjects

Philosophy

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