Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities

A critical analysis of Peter Winch's epistemological foundations in intercultural communication

Document Type : Review Paper

Authors

Davood Rahimi Sojasi, 1
Mojtaba Akhoondi 2

1 Assistant Professor of Culture and Communication, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Humanities, Shahed University, Tehran, Iran

2 Adjunct Professor, Department of Social Studies, School of Humanities, Jamiat-ul-Mustafa, Qom, Iran

https://doi.org/10.22035/isih.2024.5157.4930
Abstract
The foundation of modern sciences on absolute and fundamental philosophies, or in other words, the construction of supplementary philosophies, represents an approach that the scientific community in the West has pursued in recent decades. This pursuit is such that it attributes part of its scientific superiority and dominance to the extension of those absolute philosophies into new sciences. Among those who have successfully engaged with this extension, emphasizing the field of sociology, is Peter Winch, who has managed to philosophically enrich this discipline. The main question of this research is: What are Peter Winch's epistemological foundations in intercultural communication? The method employed in this study is qualitative, with an interpretive approach and an analytical-critical perspective. According to Winch, since rules are inherently social, understanding the actions of others and various cultures requires the comprehension of governing rules. He also asserts that there is no meta-language or meta-rule encompassing all. Winch views rationality standards as arising from diverse life forms and social contexts, thus considering rationality standards to be multiple and non-comparable. He argues that each culture possesses its own specific rational evaluation criteria, where deviation from these rules undermines rationality. In his view, standards and rules do not qualify as criteria until they are elevated to a social level. Essentially, Winch emphasizes social rules while denying private language and rejecting transcultural rationality. He believes that to understand human actions and diverse cultures, one must recognize the governing social rules. He contends that there is no overarching meta-language or meta-rule that encompasses all rules, and that rationality standards depend on varied life forms and social contexts. This implies that rationality cannot be uniformly assessed across different cultures; each culture has its unique criteria for rational evaluation. Deviating from these rules can lead to a loss of rationality. Therefore, Winch underscores the importance of social rules and rejects private language and transcultural rationality, asserting that standards and rules are only recognized as such when elevated to a social level.

Keywords

Intercultural Communication
Interpretivists
Epistemological Foundations
Rationality
Subjects
Agassi, J., & Jarvie, I. C. (1972). The Rationality of Dogmatism. In Joseph Agassi & Ian Charles Jarvie (Eds.), Rationality: The Critical View (pp. 431-443).
Alavinia, S. (2001). Ma’refat šenāsi-ye riyāzi-ye Wittgenstein va Quine [Epistemology of mathematics: Wittgenstein and Quine]. Tehran, Iran: Niloufar.
Asayesh, H. (2006). Osul va ravešhā-ye barnāmerizi-ye nāhiye’i [Principles and methods of regional planning]. Tehran, Iran: Payām-e Noor Press.
Bentham, T., & Cryb, I. (2015). Falsafe-ye olum-e ejtemāi: bonyādhā-ye falsafi-ye tafakkor-e ejtemā’i [Philosophy of social sciences: Philosophical foundations of social thought] (Sh. Mosama Parast, & M. Mottahed, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Agah Press. 
Ebrahimpour, G. (2012). Raveš-šenāsi-ye andiše-ye ejtemā’i-ye Durkheim, Winch, & Allameh Tabatabai [Methodology of social thought of Durkheim, Winchand Allameh Tabatabai]. Cultural Social Knowledge, 103, 8-124.
Esmaikhani, M. R. (2012). Mabādi-ye falsafi-ye “qavā’ed” dar olume ejtemā’i az Winch tā Davidson [Philosophical principles of “rules” in social sciences from Winch to Davidson]. Javidãn Khord, 17(37), 37-57.
Gellner, E. (1968). The New Idealism — Cause and Meaning in the Social Sciences. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics (Vol. 49; Pp. 377-432). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Gellner, Ernest. (1968). The New Idealism — Cause and Meaning in the Social Sciences. In Lakatos Imre & Musgrave Alan (Eds.), Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics (Vol. Volume 49, pp. 377-432): Elsevier.
Ghasemi, E., & Ebrahimzadeh, I. (2015). Arzyābi-ye šāxeshā-ye kāledi maskan šahri ba ruykarde towse'e pāydar [Assessment of the physical indexs of urban housing by sustainable development approach case study: city of Saman. Journal of Urban - Regional Studies and Research, 7(26), 83-104.
Hall, W.L.H. (1997). Tārix va falsafe-ye elm [History and philosophy of science] (A. Azarang, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Soroush.
Hollis, M. (1967). The Limits of Irrationality. European Journal of Sociology [Archives Européennes de Sociologie], 8(02), 265-271.
Jarvie, I. C. (1972). Concepts and society. London: Routledge and K. Paul.
Kuhn, T. S. (1996). The structure of scientific revolutions (3rd ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Latifi, G. (2009). Barresi-ye tatbiqi-ye ārāye raveš šenāxti-ye Max Weber va Peter Winch [Comparative study of the methodological views of Max Weber and Peter Winch]. Jāvidān-e Xord, 16(46), 75-105.
Little, D. (2002). Tabyin dar olum-e ejtemā’i [Variaties of Roeial explanation: an introductions to the philosoply of soual Seience] (A, Soroush, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Serat Cultural Institute.
Mawens, H. (2000). Darāmedi bar resāle-ye Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: an introduction] (S. Alavinia, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Tarh-e Now.
Paikin, R., & Ostrol, A. (1996). Metāfizik va falsafe-ye mo’āser [Metaphysics and contemporary philosophy]. Tehran, Iran: Human Sciences Research Institute.
Panhai, G. (2017). Tabyin-e falsafe-ye yādgiri ba ta’kid bar nazariye-ye yādgiri-ye Winch [Philosophical explanation of learning with emphasis on Winch’s learning theory]. Research in Educational Systems, 11(36), 181-208.
Popper, K. R. (1949). Towards a rational theory of tradition. In F. Watts (Ed.), The Rationalist Annual 1949 (pp. 36-55). London: Watts Reprint H.
Sharifzadeh, R. (2013). Ašyā-ye fekri, ašyā-ye fiziki, Peter Winch va Thomas Kuhn [Thinking objects, physical objects, Peter Winch and Thomas Kuhn]. Methodology of Humanities, 19(74), 69-89.
Taylor, C. (1982). Rationality. In M. Hollis & S. Lukes (Eds.), Rationality and relativism (1st ed., pp. 87-105). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Trigg, R. (1999). Aqlāniyat: Aqlaniyat-e elmi va etnomethodoloži [Rationality: Scientific rationality & ethnomethodology]. Arghanon, 15, 111-128.
Winch, P. (1988). The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Winch, P. (1993). Ide-ye elm-e ejtemā’i va peyvand-e ān bā falsafe [The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy]. Tehran, Iran: Samt.
Wittgenstein, L. (2000). Dar bāb-e yeqin [On certainty] (M. Hoseini, Trans.; 1st ed.). Tehran, Iran: Hermes.
Send comment about this article
Enter Name.
Enter a valid email address.
Enter a vaid affiliation.
Enter comments (At leaset 10 words)
CAPTCHA Image
Enter Security Code Correctly.

  • Receive Date 20 January 2024
  • Revise Date 29 May 2024
  • Accept Date 15 August 2024

Home

Editorial Board

Publication Ethics

Reviewers

Submission

Contact Us